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Abstract. This paper analyzes the impact of misbehaviour on QoS provisioning 
in wireless mesh networks. Misbehaviour occurs when a network participant 
decides not to cooperate. Since cooperation is fundamental for distributed envi-
ronments such as mesh networks, misbehaviour can be a serious threat to them. 
In this work, the authors focus on the IEEE 802.11 EDCA medium access func-
tion which provides QoS in mesh networks. Simulation studies have been per-
formed to determine what realistic forms of misbehaviour can occur and what 
their impact is. From these results the most beneficial forms of MAC layer mis-
behaviour in multihop mesh networks are derived. 
Keywords: Mesh networks, QoS, IEEE 802.11, EDCA, misbehaviour. 
1   Introduction 
Wireless mesh networks are steadily becoming a popular approach for providing 
network access to people's homes, especially in suburban and rural environments. 
Mesh networks allow a neighbourhood to share a single Internet connection, thus 
solving the last mile problem. They can also bring a community together by enabling 
easy and reliable data exchange within the network. By utilizing the latest technology, 
multimedia content can be exchanged over these networks.  
Fig. 1 presents an aerial view of a mesh network. Each house in this neighbour-
hood has a wireless router, also called a Mesh Node (MN). These MNs form a back-
bone mesh network to provide robust connectivity. A mesh network can therefore be 
thought of as an immobile ad-hoc network. One of the MNs in the figure has a con-
nection to the Internet and serves as a gateway for the other MNs. The MNs provide 
network access in each home. Wireless Access Points (APs) can be attached to the 
MNs to provide wireless access to household devices such as laptops, PDAs, tablet 
PCs, etc. The MN together with the AP is called the Mesh Point (MP). Stationary PCs 
can be directly connected to the MNs through Ethernet links. 
The IEEE 802.11 standard [1] can provide wireless connectivity throughout the 
mesh network. It is currently the best choice when building a mesh network, because 
802.11 equipment has become popular, cheap, reliable, and secure. The MNs in the 
network can communicate with each other using the 5 GHz frequency band and the 
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user devices can connect with the APs using the 2.4 GHz frequency band. This makes 
the community-wide mesh part of the network separate from the wireless network in 
each household. The Enhanced Distributed Channel Access (EDCA) function ensures 
Quality of Service (QoS) at the Medium Access Control (MAC) layer and facilitates 
the exchange of multimedia content over the network. It provides traffic prioritization 
with four Access Categories (ACs) to provide appropriate QoS. These categories are, 
from the highest priority: Voice (Vo), Video (Vi), Best effort (BE), and Background 
(BK). In the upcoming 802.11 standard for mesh topologies – 802.11s [2] – EDCA is 
included as a mechanism for providing QoS. Therefore, EDCA is the main focus of 
the research presented in this paper. 
 
Fig. 1. Mesh network 
Mesh networks rely on the cooperation of all participants. A problem arises if one 
of the participants misbehaves (i.e., decides not to cooperate with others). A mesh 
node may decide to misbehave in order to gain certain measurable profits (such as 
higher throughput). Misbehaviour is always done at the cost of the well-behaved 
nodes in the network. Therefore, it would be favourable if such actions were at least 
discouraged, if not made impossible. 
Misbehaviour is a threat to networks built with the 802.11 standard because it pro-
vides no incentives to cooperate. Medium access in 802.11 is based on CSMA/CA (Car-
rier Sense Multiple Access with Collision Avoidance) and a set of pre-defined parame-
ters. In EDCA, each AC has its own set of parameters: AIFS (Arbitration InterFrame 
Space), CWmin and CWmax, and TXOP (Transmission Opportunity) (Table 1). 
Table 1. Values of EDCA Parameters 
AC AIFS CWmin CWmax TXOP [µs] 
Voice 2 7 15 3264 
Video 2 15 31 6016 
Best effort 3 31 1023 0 
Background  7 31 1023 0 
Any user can change these parameters to his/her own advantage. This can be done 
very easily with the use of the latest wireless drivers [3]. With these modifications, 
users can, for example, achieve better network access than their neighbours. Likewise, 
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 a vendor of wireless cards might decide on using non-standard parameters to achieve 
better performance. This makes misbehaviour a real threat to mesh networks. This 
problem has already been the subject of recent studies regarding cooperative envi-
ronments such as mobile ad-hoc networks (Section 2). However, no research has been 
performed on the topic of providing QoS in misbehaviour-prone mesh networks. 
Section 3 provides simulation results which determine the impact of misbehaviour 
on QoS provisioning in a multi-hop mesh environment. The focus of this work is on 
realistic misbehaviour, i.e., actions which are easy to perform and beneficial to the 
malicious user. The simulations consider modifying MAC layer parameters to either 
upgrade one's own traffic or to downgrade the traffic of others. These simulations 
show how beneficial different types of misbehaviour actually are. Finally, Section 4 
concludes the paper and describes future work. 
2   State of the Art 
The problem of misbehaviour, especially in the context of mobile ad-hoc networks, 
has been the subject of study for the last several years. The first approaches to detect-
ing misbehaviour were focused on the problem of not forwarding packets. Such ac-
tions are done at the IP layer and can be performed with the use of a firewall. The first 
benefit is that the misbehaving node has more bandwidth for its own traffic. Secondly, 
in the case of mobile nodes, it can extend its battery life.  
The first solution to not forwarding packets was presented in [4] and later independ-
ently developed into CONFIDANT [5] and CORE [6]. This family of solutions is based 
on promiscuous observation of events in the network. Many types of misbehaviour can 
be detected, not only packets which are not forwarded, but also packet manipulation. 
Statistical algorithms are used to calculate a level of reputation for each node, which in 
turn determines cooperation. Misbehaving nodes (those with a low reputation) are 
gradually isolated from the network and thus such actions are discouraged.  
The authors of [7] deal with the problem of MAC layer misbehaviour. They take 
into account several misbehaviour strategies, all dealing with manipulating the pa-
rameters of the contention window mechanism of 802.11. In their solution, it is the 
receiver, not the sender, which chooses the random backoff value. This value is trans-
ferred to the sender in either a CTS or ACK frame. Misbehaviour occurs when the 
sender deviates from that backoff.  
Paper [8] presents DOMINO, an advanced software application designed to protect 
hotspots from greedy users. It monitors traffic, collects traces and analyzes them to 
find anomalies. DOMINO can detect many types of malicious and greedy behaviour, 
including backoff manipulation techniques. Anomaly detection is based on through-
put (instead of observed backoff), which the authors acknowledge is not an optimal 
detection metric. The application can be seamlessly integrated with APs and it com-
plies with standards. Additionally, a misbehaviour detection analysis in infrastructure-
mode 802.11 EDCA WLANs can be found in [9]. However, both DOMINO and [9] 
cannot be used in distributed environments such as ad-hoc and mesh networks. 
The authors of [13] present a simulation-based technique for detecting faults in 
wireless mesh networks. They utilize traces from a network monitor to perform simu-
lations. The cause of the network behaviour can be detected, whether it is MAC layer 
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misbehaviour, link congestion, or packet dropping. This is an interesting approach, 
however, it is not real-time and it depends on inaccurate simulations. 
To summarize, there are several problems with the research efforts presented in 
this section. First of all, most research has been focused on WLANs operating in 
infrastructure mode. This is quite different from ad-hoc and mesh scenarios most 
notably because of the central access point. Secondly, the state of the art in misbehav-
iour detection is often focused on unrealistic misbehaviour. Examples include packet 
manipulation, selective jamming and other techniques which require expert skills. 
Also "adaptive" misbehaviour is considered, which is quite difficult to implement in 
real life. Furthermore, EDCA, with its four distinct sets of parameters, has not been 
taken into account in mesh network scenarios. Finally, the detection solutions are 
most often limited to only one layer of the OSI model (either Data Link or Network). 
3   Analysis and Evaluation of Misbehaving Nodes 
This section presents the results of an extensive simulation study of misbehaviour in 
mesh networks. The purpose of this analysis is to determine the impact that misbehav-
ing users can have on QoS provisioning in such networks. All simulations were per-
formed using the ns-2.28 simulator with a modified version of the TKN EDCA exten-
sion [10]. All the figures in this section present curves, where the error of each simu-
lation point for a 95% confidence interval does not exceed 2% (this is too small for 
graphical representation). 
 
Fig. 2. Mesh network scenario 
The simulated network topology is presented in Fig. 2. Each MN uses the EDCA 
function and is within range of its closest neighbour only. George's MN is a gateway 
to the Internet, Bob is sending a file to his friend Carl (Flow 1), and Alice is watching 
a video stream from the Internet (Flow 2). We can assume that UDP is used if Alice’s 
transmission is real-time and TCP is used otherwise. Her traffic uses the highest prior-
ity (Vo) to ensure high quality of the video stream. If Bob uses a lower priority (BE) 
for his file transfer, the EDCA function will ensure that Alice's video stream is unin-
terrupted by Bob's file transfer. This is shown in the reference case (case A) in section 
3.2. However, since Bob is in the path of Alice's traffic, he can misbehave by altering 
his medium access parameters. He can either simply degrade Alice’s traffic (section 
3.3) or combine this with promoting his own traffic (section 3.4). The question is: can 
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 such actions be beneficial for Bob? The answer is provided in section 3.5 which gives 
conclusions derived from the results of the simulations. 
Since there is no impact of (and therefore no gain from) misbehaviour in non-
saturated networks [11], we ensure that the simulated network is saturated. We evalu-
ate the saturation throughput for the given topology in section 3.1. In saturation, the 
traffic source may not be relevant, so CBR was chosen. The packet size was 1000 B. 
In fact, the size of the packet is not that important because we are analyzing the be-
haviour of traffic priorities (and not absolute network performance). The RTS/CTS 
mechanism was not used since only Bob's and George's MNs generate traffic and they 
are neither hidden from, nor exposed to each other. The data rate of the simulated 
network was 11 Mbit/s and AODV was used as the routing protocol. The size of the 
network is small, but for one misbehaving node it is enough to show how its actions 
will influence network performance. 
3.1   Saturation Throughput 
In order to determine the saturation throughput of the network, the following simula-
tion study was performed. The offered load of Flow 1 (Bob's file transfer) and Flow 2 
(Alice's video stream) increased simultaneously from 64 kb/s to 12 Mb/s. The default 
priority (BE) was used for both flows. Both UDP and TCP were considered as the 
transport protocols. The results are presented in Fig. 3, which shows the average flow 
throughput achieved as a function of offered load.  
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Fig. 3. Average flow throughput 
For TCP the situation is clear – the saturation throughput is reached at approxi-
mately 1 Mb/s. This is the average end-to-end throughput of each flow. However, for 
UDP traffic, once a peak is reached, the throughput decreases to zero and congestion 
collapse occurs. This is because the interface queue present in the MAC layer of ns-2 
uses the drop tail queue management algorithm. Bob’s interface queue becomes com-
pletely filled with locally generated frames, leaving no room for frames that are to be 
forwarded. In real-life wireless cards such behaviour depends on the implementation. 
This does not occur for TCP traffic because this protocol adjusts its transmission speed 
5
using the additive increase/multiplicative-decrease algorithm. With respect to these 
results, an offered load of just over 2 Mb/s was chosen as the saturation throughput for 
this network scenario. In the following subsections, several different simulations were 
performed. Table 2 contains a brief description of all the considered cases. 
Table 2. Descriptions of all cases 
Case Description 
A Reference situation, no misbehaviour 
B Bob changes the Vo parameters in his router to resemble BK priority (simple mis-
behaviour) 
C Case B + CWmin of forwarded traffic is set to maximal value (1023) 
D Bob uses CWmin = CWmax = 1 and TXOP = 8160 µs for his traffic 
E Case D + Case B (simple misbehaviour, change of forwarded traffic priority) 
F Case E + CWmin of forwarded traffic set to maximal value (1023) 
G Case F + Bob uses AIFS = 1 
3.2   Reference Case 
Case A is the reference situation. Alice uses Vo priority, whereas Bob consecutively 
uses each of the four EDCA priorities for his file transfer. Table 3 shows the through-
put results that both flows achieved in the first (Flow 1a, 2a) and the second (Flow 1b, 
2b) hop. Fig. 4 presents the end-to-end throughput values for both flows. If Bob is 
using the same priority as Alice (i.e., Vo) they both achieve similar throughput. 
Otherwise, if Bob uses a lower priority, his throughput is likewise lower. This is in 
accordance with the EDCA function. An interesting observation is that the decrease in 
throughput when Bob changes priorities from Vo to Vi is much larger for TCP than 
UDP. The explanation of this is that Flow 1 had to contend twice for the medium and 
twice with a lower priority. TCP is more sensitive than UDP to congestion, especially 
in wireless environments. 
Table 3. Per-hop throughput results for case A (in Kb/s) 
UDP TCP Flow 1 
priority F1a F1b F2a F2b F1a F1b F2a F2b 
Vo 1771 1364 1775 1363 1158 1096 1115 1055 
Vi 1199 923 2111 2111 198 187 2039 1929 
BE 1131 870 2111 2111 137 131 2095 1982 
BK 1054 775 2111 2111 25 23 2207 2089 
3.3   Downgrading Forwarded Traffic 
In case B we assume that Bob runs a simple yet malicious script (perhaps found on 
the Internet) on his wireless router. This script changes the Vo parameters in his 
router to resemble BK priority. The priority of Alice's traffic is lowered but the frames 
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Fig. 4. End-to-end throughput results for case A 
are not manipulated. Again, Alice uses Vo priority, whereas Bob consecutively uses 
each of the four EDCA priorities for his file transfer. The throughput results (Fig. 5) 
again reveal interesting observations. When Bob is using Vo priority he sends his 
traffic using his modified EDCA parameters. This means that on the first hop, his 
traffic is sent at BK priority, and then forwarded as Vo priority (Fig. 6). For Alice's 
traffic, the priorities are reversed (first hop with Vo, second with BK). Why is Bob's 
end-to-end throughput higher? If we look at the hop-by-hop UDP throughput for Vo 
priority (Table 4) we see a similar situation as before: 100% of Bob's traffic and only 
33% of Alice's traffic is forwarded. Again, locally generated traffic wins with traffic 
that is to be forwarded. When Bob uses Vi or BE priority he achieves the throughput 
gain that he was expecting. This gain is obviously higher for Vi than for BE. When 
Bob's file transfer is using BK priority, another interesting situation occurs. The per-
hop use of priorities is shown in Fig. 7. When UDP is used, Alice's flow has more 
throughput (because it first has Vo and then BK whereas Bob's flow always has BK). 
However for TCP this is not the case, even though both flows have about 95% of 
traffic forwarded. This seems to be a similar case to the one described in [12], 
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Fig. 5. End-to-end throughput results for case B 
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 Fig. 6. Priorities used in Case B, Flow 1 priority: Vo 
 
Fig. 7. Priorities used in Case B, Flow 1 priority: BK 
Table 4. Per-hop throughput results for case B (in Kb/s) 
UDP TCP Flow 1 
priority F1a F1b F2a F2b F1a F1b F2a F2b 
Vo 1482 1482 2111 686 1420 1343 710 672 
Vi 1962 1958 2111 201 2192 2074 82 78 
BE 1616 1503 2111 828 1787 1691 450 425 
BK 1180 1136 2111 1430 1352 1279 815 771 
 
where it was shown that TCP may completely change throughput allocation inde-
pendently of the EDCA configuration. 
Case C is similar to the previous one: Bob again modifies the Vo parameters in his 
router. This time he increases the CWmin parameter to its maximum value (1023). 
Bob has now degraded the Vo priority almost as severely as possible using EDCA 
parameter modification. The results are presented in Fig. 8 and Table 5. When Bob 
uses the Vo priority for his traffic, the situation is similar to that in case B. However, 
in this case the throughput values are significantly lower because of the high CW 
parameters. For all other priorities (Vi, BE, and BK) it can be seen that misbehaviour 
brings meaningful gains. The fact that Bob's throughput is high even if he uses BK 
signifies the importance of the CW parameters on throughput. 
Table 5. Per-hop throughput results for case C (in Kb/s) 
UDP TCP Flow 1 
priority F1a F1b F2a F2b F1a F1b F2a F2b 
Vo 428 428 2115 120 336 318 168 159 
Vi 2052 2049 2111 7 2269 2147 3 2 
BE 1917 1905 2111 34 2199 2081 19 18 
BK 1775 1774 2111 57 2092 1980 34 32 
3.4   Promoting Local Traffic 
In section 3.3 (cases B and C) Bob was gaining throughput by degrading the traffic 
parameters of forwarded traffic. In the following cases (D to G) we assume that Bob 
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Fig. 8. End-to-end throughput results for case C 
further manipulates EDCA parameters, this time in order to increase the medium 
access probability for his own traffic. In these cases Bob always uses the Vi priority 
for his file transfer. The results are presented in Table 6 and Fig. 9. In case D Bob 
uses the lowest possible CW parameters (CWmin = CWmax = 1) and the highest 
possible TXOP value (8160 µs). It might seem surprising that these parameters do not 
allow Bob to have a higher throughput than Alice. With UDP, he is able to achieve 
maximum throughput, but only on the first hop (Table 6). On the second hop this 
throughput decreases because Bob is using Vi priority, and Alice's traffic is using Vo 
priority. The results for TCP are similar, taking into account congestion control. In 
case E, Bob not only uses the most optimal EDCA parameters for Vi (like in case D) 
but also uses the simple misbehaviour that was presented in case B. This time, misbe-
haviour is advantageous for Bob in terms of achieved throughput. Case F differs from 
the previous one in that the CWmin parameter of Vo is increased to its maximal value 
(1023). The result is an even higher throughput for Bob. Finally, case G was modified 
from the previous one by also cheating on the AIFS value and changing it from 2 to 1. 
This brought a further, though minor increase in throughput. 
Table 6. Per-hop throughput results for cases D, E, F, and G (in Kb/s) 
UDP TCP Case 
F1a F1b F2a F2b F1a F1b F2a F2b 
D 2111 662 1754 1755 260 246 1979 1873 
E 2111 1878 2111 229 2191 2074 113 107 
F 2111 2060 2111 32 2279 2157 20 19 
G 2111 2111 2111 35 2318 2194 29 27 
3.5   Lessons Learned 
The results from the simulations have been gathered in Fig. 10, which presents the 
throughput gain that a misbehaving user can achieve. The gain was calculated as the 
ratio of the highest throughput in each case to the throughput achieved in case A (for 
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Vo priority). Since the network was in saturation, it can be assumed that the gain of 
misbehaving Bob was equal to the loss of well-behaving Alice. 
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Fig. 9. End-to-end throughput results for cases D, E, F, and G 
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Fig. 10. Maximum throughput gain for misbehaving user 
With the exception of case D, all the combinations of misbehaviour turned out to 
be very beneficial. For UDP there was a 40-50% increase, and for TCP – a 90-100% 
increase in throughput. The conclusion is that in all cases when Bob degraded the 
EDCA parameters of Alice's traffic he was able to achieve substantially higher 
throughput. He achieved best performance in case G, in which he both downgraded 
Alice's Vo traffic and promoted his Vi traffic. He changed his Vo priority parameters 
to resemble BK and additionally changed the CWmin of Vo to its maximum possible 
value. At the same time he changed the parameters of his Vi traffic to be optimal (i.e., 
lowest possible CWmin, highest possible TXOP, and lowest possible AIFS).  
The unexpected result from these simulations is that, to achieve higher throughput 
in a multihop environment, it is significantly more important to degrade forwarded 
traffic than promote one's own. This problem has not been noticed before in literature 
and will influence future misbehaviour detection schemes. In multihop, EDCA-based 
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 networks, it is important to check for anomalies in the EDCA parameters used by 
neighbouring nodes. However, previous detection schemes focused only on detecting 
lowered parameters. The above results show that it is also necessary to monitor in-
creased parameters, as this may lead to the downgrading of forwarded traffic.  
4   Summary and Future Work 
Misbehaviour occurs when a malicious user changes the settings of his/her MN in 
order to gain better medium access. This paper has presented the impact that realistic 
MAC layer misbehaviour has on QoS provisioning in mesh networks. Two forms of 
EDCA parameter modification were considered: downgrading forwarded traffic and 
promoting local traffic. It has been shown that this is a real threat to wireless mesh 
networks because it allows easy access to higher throughput and also degrades QoS 
provisioning. The main conclusion is that, in multihop scenarios, degrading forwarded 
traffic yields a greater advantage than cheating on medium access parameters.  
Countermeasures to prevent misbehaviour are, therefore, required for mesh net-
works. Along this line, we envisage as future work the development of an architecture 
able to provide reliable multimedia content delivery, as well as, to deal with the prob-
lem of stations not adhering to standards. Based on the results presented in this paper, 
we will focus on detecting priority degradation of forwarded traffic. To this aim, an 
analytical model for detecting contention window manipulation in 802.11 EDCA 
mesh networks needs to be derived and some procedures to mitigate the influence of 
misbehaviour need to be proposed. These countermeasures should provide an incen-
tive for the malicious users to cease their illegitimate actions.   
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